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ABSTRACT
The savings and loan scandal and the soft real estate market of the early nineties left
banks and bank regulators with the disposition of thousands of foreclosed real estate
properties. These properties are now the focus of a new housing program at the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, a quasi-public institution that encourages
affordable housing with below-market rate financing. Through Recovery Through
the Acquisition of Housing (REACH), developers finance existing properties, held by
a bank or bank regulatory agency such as the FDIC or RTC, that may be vacant,
occupied, complete, incomplete, or in need of capital improvements.
The program's main objective is to turn the overbuilding of the 1980s, especially in
the condominium and luxury markets, into much-needed affordable housing while
simultaneously contributing to the Commonwealth's economic recovery. REACH's
secondary objective, like other MHFA programs, is to encourage projects that
further the Agency's social and economic development program goals.
MHFA based these objectives on many implicit operating assumptions. This thesis
is concerned with the following two: 1) The REACH program is the appropriate
instrument for both converting REO properties into affordable housing and
fulfilling MHFA program goals; and 2) REACH is a competitive financing source for
developers seeking REO opportunities. The purpose of this thesis is to test these
operating assumptions and determine whether the goals of REACH are realistic.
After eight months of observing the program, one financed project, and a series of
interviews with affordable housing professionals, this thesis concluded that the
REACH program as originally designed was not an appropriate mechanism for
financing REO properties. Problems with the program included insufficient
financial support, unattainable underwriting standards, and the lack of interest of
REO property holders. Therefore, though MHFA's efforts represented an innovative
use for REO properties, the program's package was not attractive to the real estate
industry.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Bacow
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
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(2) RESEARCH QUESTIONS
(3) SIGNIFICANCE
(4) METHODOLOGY
(5) THESIS OUTLINE
(1) INTRODUCTION
The savings and loan scandal and a softening real estate market have left
banks and bank regulators with the disposition of thousands of foreclosed
real estate properties. These properties are now the focus of a new housing
program at the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, a quasi-public insti-
tution that attempts to stimulate the production of affordable housing by
providing below-market financing to housing developers.
Recovery Through the Acquisition of Housing (REACH) is the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency's (MHFA's) newest program.
Developers refinance existing properties held by a bank or bank regulatory
agency such as the FDIC or RTC that may be vacant or occupied, complete or
incomplete, or in need of capital improvements. MHFA advertises favorable
mortgage rates and flexible processing in return for an affordability restric-
tion on 20% of the units for the 30 year life of the mortgage:
MHFA's ability to provide acquisition, rehabilitation and long-term
debt financing in a single underwriting provides a unique opportunity
to utilize bank and government held housing resources. For qualified
projects and borrowers, below-market tax-exempt financing used in
conjunction with low-income housing tax credits and discounted ac-
quisition costs can provide a cost-effective financing package with lit-
tle or no state or local subsidies. 1
The program's main objective is to turn the overbuilding of the 1980s,
especially in the condominium and luxury markets, into much-needed af-
1MHFA Information: Recovery Through the Acquisition of Housing 1992, (REACH), p. 1.
fordable housing. In the state's sluggish development environment,
REACH's secondary objective is to establish MHFA as a participant in one of
the few active real estate markets, Real Estate Owned (REO). And finally, like
other MHFA programs, program guidelines attempt to select projects with
strong economic development potential. Specifically, MHFA is interested in
stimulating the real estate industry, creating jobs, unburdening banks, or
serving specialized housing needs, such as elders, the homeless, or minority
households. MHFA has identified in its annual strategic goals, that it intends
to develop five REACH properties in fiscal year 1993.
MHFA based the program's objectives on two implicit operating as-
sumptions: 1) there is a stock of REO units that is suitable and efficient for
conversion to affordable housing; and 2) MHFA's subsidy provided through
REACH is sufficient to cover the financial shortfalls that originally rendered
these projects infeasible. The purpose of this thesis is to test these operating
assumptions and determine whether the goals of the REACH program are
realistic.
(2) RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Despite the high expectations of REACH and MHFA's offers of favorable fi-
nancing, only one project, Broadway Tower, has received funding since the
inception of the program in 1991. This tepid reception and the splashy re-
launch of REACH in the Spring of 1992 suggest that either the developments
or the program cannot meet the objectives of the Agency and, at the same
time interest local banks and developers. Thus a closer look at the REO mar-
ket, the first and only REACH deal, and MHFA's package may provide clues
as to why demand for REACH has been limited, and if the program can be
improved. The larger part of this thesis is based on the following research
questions:
1. Is REACH a competitive financing product?
2. Can REACH, in its current form, meet MHFA's goals outlined for the
program?
3. Is the REACH initiative an adequate response to the REO market?
(3) SIGNIFICANCE
In a real estate environment that is unfavorable to almost any type of devel-
opment, there are dismally few incentives for developers to take on the chal-
lenges of affordable housing. Programs such as REACH and the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit literally provide the only subsidies available for multi-
family affordable housing. In addition, MHFA believes that REACH can help
unburden some of the ailing private banks holding large amounts of fore-
closed properties, and give a boost to the Massachusetts economy. Therefore,
REACH is identified as a top priority in the Commonwealth's
Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS) as well as MHFA's
Strategic Goals.
(4) METHODOLOGY
This thesis is organized as a case study and program analysis of the REACH
financing program. It draws on interviews with over twenty Massachusetts
housing and development professionals, recent trade articles, and the pro-
gram literature of more than ten housing finance programs. Additionally, an
important source of primary information has been the author's own obser-
vations at the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency; experience with the
program's marketing; and innumerable, informal, and invaluable conversa-
tions with the staff of the Development Department at MHFA.
(5) THESIS OUTLINE
The following four chapters explore various aspects of the REACH program.
Chapter 2 is a case study of the first development financed through REACH.
Chapter 3 is a cursory survey of selected lending institutions and a compari-
tive analysis of REO financing options. Chapter 4 critiques the REACH initia-
tive at MHFA. And finally, Chapter 5 presents a synthesis of the observations
and lessons learned from the initial efforts, and direction for enhancing the
initiative.
CHAPTER II: BROADWAY TOWER, THE FIRST REACH DEAL
(1) INTRODUCTION
(2) PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY
(3) THE FIRST MHFA PROPOSAL
(4) THE CONCORD MANAGEMENT COMPANY PROPOSAL
(5) THE REVISED MHFA DEAL
(6) CONCLUSION AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE REACH PROGRAM
(1) INTRODUCTION
Broadway Tower is the first development to receive mortgage financing
through the REACH program - Recovery Through the Acquisition of
Housing. The Broadway Tower deal illustrates first, why Real Estate Owned
(REO) properties require special underwriting, and second, the need for
MHFA to offer a competitive, flexible financing package. Broadway Tower
also illustrates the difficult path that any affordable housing project must
travel to secure adequate financing. The developer first submitted the project
to MHFA, which turned it down. It was then submitted in revised form to a
conventional mortgage company; and then it was resubmitted to MHFA,
which finally approved it under the new REACH program. The Agency's ex-
perience with this project and its developer will likely prove useful in assess-
ing future REACH deals and MHFA's competitiveness in financing REO
properties.
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the history of the
deal, identify the characteristic that made MHFA's financing first unattractive
and then attractive, and illustrate what further analysis might be necessary to
analyze the REACH program. This chapter is organized as a case study of
Broadway Tower. It details the development's history, the three mortgage
proposals, and the deal's significance for the REACH program.
(2) PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY
Vincent C. Fantasia and the Revere Investment Trust developed Broadway
Tower as condominiums and commercial units at 250 Broadway in Revere,
Massachusetts. 1 The project was completed in 1990. The development con-
tains 95 one- and two-bedroom residential units, 1,411 square feet of
commercial storage space, a first floor covered parking unit of 30 spaces, and
uncovered space for additional parking. The six-story building features brick
veneer, balconies, a sprinkler system and two elevators. Each unit contains a
refrigerator, electric range/oven, dishwasher, garbage disposal, carpeting,
washer/dryer hook-ups, smoke detector and gas meter.
The original development concept was to appeal to 'empty-nesters'
(older couples and individuals with no children) to distinguish Broadway
Tower from the luxury condominiums on Revere's popular waterfront tar-
geted to young professionals. The original unit prices for a 2-bedroom apart-
ment ranged from $129,000 - $149,000.
Broadway Tower is located in Revere, Massachusetts in its central
business district. The development benefits from easy access to Broadway's
commercial and retail amenities, as well as bus service on Broadway and a
"T" stop one mile away. Revere is approximately five miles north of Boston
on the North Shore and has a stable population of about 42,000. According to
the Concord Mortgage Company,
Revere is generally a typical older, close-in suburb to a major city. The
city has some manufacturing, commercial and retail employment and
opportunities; however, no major industrial , manufacturing, com-
mercial, or retail facilities are located within its boundaries. The work-
force can generally be characterized as blue collar ... 2
1The Project History and Concord Mortgage Company Proposal sections are adapted from an
Underwriting Memorandum of the Concord Mortgage Company, 1991.
2Underwriting Memorandum of the Concord Mortgage Company, 1991, p. 7.
Housing within Revere consists of single-family, row/townhouses,
apartments and condominiums. In addition, there are a number of failed
condominiums. There is a need for affordable housing, however, in the en-
tire metropolitan Boston area and the Revere Housing Authority has a wait-
ing list of over 700 families for affordable units. 3
The timing for Broadway Tower could not have been worse. The mar-
keting for the project coincided with the collapse of the Massachusetts real es-
tate market. As a result, the original developer sold only three of the condo-
miniums, the commercial storage space, and the covered parking unit before
the project failed. Like thousands of other properties in the Northeast that
were built near the end of the 1980s real estate boom, Broadway Tower was a
victim of the softening market and simultaneous condominium glut. Then,
in June, 1990, the Eliot Savings Bank failed and the Federal Depositors
Insurance Company (FDIC) obtained Broadway Tower's $7,800,000 construc-
tion mortgage loan. At this point, the property had not yet been foreclosed
and Vincent Fantasia was still working with the FDIC in a effort to sell more
of the units or find a new developer.
In March of 1991, the Winn Development Company entered into a
Purchase and Sale Agreement with Vincent Fantasia and the FDIC to pur-
chase Broadway Tower excluding the three condominiums and commercial
units that had already been sold. The price was $5,500,000 plus $600,000 to
Vincent Fantasia and the Revere Investment Trust who were still technically
the owners of the property. Winn Development Company proposed purchas-
ing the 92 available units to lease to tenants as affordable housing. Arthur
Winn, the founder of Winn Development, is an experienced developer of
commercial properties like the Bostonian Hotel, and an affordable housing
3 1bid.
veteran with over 2400 units in his portfolio and $114,000,000 in loans.
Winn's most relevant experience, moreover, was the conversion and man-
agement of Kendrigan Place, another failed, luxury condominium project,
... in Quincy containing 78 units. Financing and operations for the
project were provided by a modification of the existing private debt,
RDAL subsidies, and Federal Low income Housing Tax Credits. The
development punchlist items were completed by the Winn
Organization and it now enjoys sustaining occupancy and a positive
cash flow.4
Thus it would appear that Broadway Tower was an ideal project for
MHFA. The project had already failed. Winn had substantial experience con-
verting a similar project to affordable housing. And Revere was clearly in
need of additional affordable units. The next section describes Winn
Development's first financing proposal submitted to MHFA on March 25,
1991.
(3) THE FIRST MHFA PROPOSAL
Affordable housing deals are by necessity a patchwork quilt of multiple sub-
sidy programs. The first deal submitted by Winn to MHFA was no exception.
To make the deal work, Winn proposed that the reduced purchase price be fi-
nanced by a below market rate mortgage from MHFA. To this advantageous
financing, Winn proposed obtaining an annual operating subsidy from the
State of Massachusetts RDAL5 program, an allocation of Low Income Housing
4Ibid., p. 4.
5 RDAL - Rental Housing Development Action Loan - is a now defunct loan program of the State
of Massachusetts. It was designed as an operating subsidy to encourage the development of
rental units affordable to low income people.
Tax Credits6, and a target population of Section 8 Certificate 7 holders (See
Exhibit 2).8 The owner of the development would be the Broadway Tower
Limited Partnership (See Exhibit 4 for the structure of the partnership) and
the deal did not include the three purchased condominiums, parking spaces,
or storage space.
MHFA declined to provide a mortgage for Broadway Tower under
these terms for several reasons. First, MHFA was uncomfortable about financ-
ing a development where the developer did not have ownership (control) of
all the units. The Agency feared complications from the private owners of the
condominiums, such as complaints about declining property values, inability
to enforce control or standards over the privately-held units, or difficulties se-
curing ownership. Therefore, the Agency suggested that Winn also acquire
the purchased units from the individual owners in order to avoid complica-
tions that might arise.9
Second, MHFA prepared its own analyses of value and feasibility that
did not agree with Winn's mortgage proposal (See Exhibit 5). For example, on
April 19, 1991, MHFA's in-house Appraisal and Marketing Department ap-
praised Broadway Tower between $5.7 and $5.9 million, depending on the
capitalization rate. (An independent appraiser hired by MHFA reported a
6The Low Income Housing Tax Credit is one of very few federal initiatives to encourage low
income housing. Private investors receive direct tax credits to income for contributing equity to
developments with significant low income housing components. It is a complicated program
that relies heavily on the expertise of syndicators, accountants, and lawyers for
administration.
7The Section 8 Certificate is one of the last widespread federal programs in housing. People
earning less than 50% of an area's median income receive a certificate that can be used in any
type of housing. It guarantees that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
will pay the difference between HUD-established fair market rents for an area and 30% of a
tenants income.
8The development budgets are not shown, but each deal includes an allocation of The Low
Income Housing Tax Credit.
9This information obtained from a letter to Winn Development Company from Broadway
Tower's Development Officer at MHFA; May 24, 1991.
lower value of only $4.8 million.) Since the Agency's underwriting standards
for loan amount was a maximum of 90% of value, it could agree to a mort-
gage no greater than $5,278,725. By contrast, Winn was requesting a loan of
$6,581,800, which included $4,990,500 for acquisition costs, plus expenses for
the broker, past invoices, the private units, and land.
MHFA's appraisal was substantially below the value claimed by Winn
largely because of the conservative assumptions adopted by MHFA in its pro
forma for Broadway Tower, which differed from Winn's estimates regarding
the number of expected tenants that would pay market-rate rents, one-bed-
room rents, operating expenses, and trending rates. MHFA's analysis sug-
gested that the deal could not meet the Agency's 110% debt service coverage
requirement. Winn Development felt that Broadway Tower was an invalu-
able affordable housing resource and that MHFA's underwriting standards
should be more flexible as a result. At this point, negotiations deadlocked,
Winn took the project out of active status at MHFA, and approached The
Concord Mortgage Company for financing.
(4) THE CONCORD MORTGAGE COMPANY PROPOSAL
The Broadway Tower proposal to the Concord Mortgage Company was based
on a mortgage from the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA).
FNMA also thought the mortgage was unusual because it did not cover all
the units, but could find no legal reason not to approve it. Winn requested a
mortgage of $6,300,000 for 18 years, a 25 year amortization period and a rate of
10.375% under FNMA's joint venture Affordable Housing Initiative (See
Exhibit 2). The high loan amount was not a problem, as Concord agreed with
Winn's independent appraiser, who found Broadway Tower to be worth ap-
proximately $8,000,000. (This enormous difference in appraisals suggests that
far from being a science, appraisal is an art. Moreover, the criteria used in ap-
praising a particular property are highly subjective.)
Winn's appraiser, RPR Economic Consultants of Vienna Virginia, and
the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency's Appraisal and Marketing
Department's estimation of value differed on the following major points:
MHFA RPR
Gross Rental Income $854,112 $916,836
Annual Laundry Income $6,624 $9,384
Operating Expenses $407,580 ($4,430/unit) $372,255 ($4,046/unit)
Net Operating Income $453,156 $553,965
As with any loan, it is ability to pay that limits the amount of the loan.
In this case, MHFA's lower estimate for Net Operating Income meant a
smaller amount available to pay debt service and therefore a lower loan
amount. It is the Net Operating Income that also determines the value of the
investment. In the Direct Income Capitalization method of appraisal, the pre-
sent value of the cash flow and an assumed sale value are discounted at a dis-
count rate that reflects the current market risk to arrive at the value the in-
vestment. Therefore, MHFA's lower NOI would, of course, lead to a lower
maximum loan amount. RPR, however, selected a discount rate that reflected
a higher degree of risk -- 12%. If they had assumed 11%, like MHFA, their es-
timate would have been even higher.
MHFA RPR
Value (Direct Capitalization) $5,865,249 (11%) $8,073,899 (12%)10
MHFA's more conservative estimates for income and expenses were
based on the following observations of comparable developments:
10 MHFA Appraisal and Marketing report prepared by Robert Quealy. April 19, 1991, p. 4.
The subject offers little in the way of amenities, no pool, grounds or
view, smaller than average units, and an active, main street location.
All of the comparable developments except [one] offer a pool. The sub-
ject also offers the smallest 1BR unit of the 12 comparables and the third
smallest 2BR unit.11
The Effective Rental Income appears to be calculated incorrectly.... The
management fee [therefore] should be reflected at $49,394.... The subject
property's 1992 administrative expenses are considerably lower than ...
the comparables. The comparison is as follows:
Broadway Tower @ $404 per unit
Comparable Properties @ $1,495 - $1,858 per unit.
[Broadway Tower's] Management did not budget for Legal, Audit, and
Accounting and Data Processing fees. Also, the Administrative Payroll
at $19,000 is considerably lower than the Administrative Payroll at most
of the other developments managed by Winn....
The subject property's 1991 maintenance expenses, on a per unit basis,
are significantly lower than... comparables...:
Broadway Tower @ $765 per unit
Comparable Properties @ $1,495 - $1,858 per unit.12
These estimates arguably reflect MHFA's extensive experience with the re-
gion, similar developments, other management companies, and affordable
housing in general.
In the proposal to the Concord Mortgage Company, the Executive
Office of Communities and Development (EOCD) also committed an annual
operating subsidy of $230,000 for 13 years through their program Rental
Housing Development Action Loan Program (RDAL). For Broadway Tower,
participation in RDAL required only the following two deal-specific condi-
tions: 1) reserve in perpetuity 25% of the purchased units as affordable rental
housing for individuals or families whose incomes are below 80% of the area
11Ibid., p. 2.
12 MHFA Management Document prepared by Leslie Giddings and Colleen Kelley. April 19,
1991, p. 2.
median and 2) reserve for 15 years an additional 36% of the units as affordable
housing. 13
The final component of the Concord deal was an annual allocation of
$500,000 of Tax Credits for 10 years. The expected equity value to the sponsors
was estimated at $2,200,000. The Tax Credit occupancy restriction required 50%
of the units to be rented to individuals or families at 80% of the area median
income level for 15 years.
The target occupancy was 59 low income units for Section 8 certificate
holders and 33 market-rate units. Winn, the Concord Mortgage Company,
and independent appraisers RPR Economic Consultants felt that the project's
quality of design and construction, easily accessible location, minimal im-
provements ($140,000) and new financing plan would "support Broadway
Tower's long-term attractiveness and marketability." 14
At the last minute, the Massachusetts Legislature failed to fund the
RDAL program for Fiscal Year 1992. EOCD could not honor the commitment
and the deal collapsed. Without the $230,000 annual operating subsidy, the
project was no longer feasible. Winn was under considerable pressure to find
financing before the Purchase and Sale agreement with the FDIC expired.
At the same time that Winn was seeking financing for Broadway
Tower, affordable housing developers were embroiled in a debate with
MHFA. The debate was over who should share in the savings derived from a
portion of the HUD Section 8 subsidy known as the Financing Adjustment
Factor (FAF). A Development Officer at MHFA describes FAF as follows:
13At MHFA, and for the purposes of REACH, "affordable" annual rent is defined as 30% of 50%
of a federally recognized statistical area's median income.
14 Underwriting Memorandum of the Concord Mortgage Company, 1991, p. 9.
The FAF, granted in the early 80's, was necessary because exceptionally
high interest rates were affecting the production of affordable housing.
The FAF represented additional Section 8 subsidy which was used as an
interest subsidy which equalled the difference between an 8% feasibility
rate and the actual bond funding rates. In 1992, MHFA took advantage
of a program offered by HUD to refund the existing bonds at lower
bond rates. FAF savings were shared between MHFA and HUD. Use of
savings received by MHFA are restricted to very low income housing
uses. 15
Aware that MHFA expected a large refund of FAF, Winn returned to MHFA
and strongly proposed that the Agency finance the deal and replace the RDAL
commitment with FAF money.
(5) THE REVISED MHFA DEAL
By this time, there was a different climate for financing at MHFA. Two factors
contributed significantly to this. First, the increasing number of REO proper-
ties in Massachusetts had gained more political exposure. The State's
Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS), the Executive Office
of Communities and Development (EOCD), and MHFA had all identified
REO properties as a priority affordable housing resource and a way to boost
the Massachusetts economy. Even while the formal REACH program was still
under consideration, the Deputy Director of MHFA, Eleanor White, had al-
ready intervened with the FDIC to strategize on a role for the Agency in pro-
moting REACH-type deals.
Second, many professionals at MHFA concluded that the Agency could
no longer afford to choose only traditional developments for financing; a dif-
ficult development climate necessitates more flexible underwriting and more
15Personal interview with Shirley Abrams, Development Officer, MHFA. August 8, 1992.
aggressive marketing for financial products to insure a stream of business. 16
The Agency supports its own operating costs largely through the financing
fees charged included in project mortgages. Furthermore, Judith Richards
notes that
...the imbalance in financial returns to developers and lenders in the
1970s and dramatic fluctuations in interest rates in the 1980s caused
lenders to rethink their traditional role as fixed-rate, long term lenders.
Real estate financing is now a more creative art in which each financ-
ing package is fully negotiable. 17
Thus this trend has, in part, brought about the negotiated pro forma.
When Winn approached MHFA for the second time, the Agency re-
considered both the developer's extensive relationship with MHFA and its
own traditional way of analyzing developments. Negotiations between
MHFA and Winn began again and both parties conceded on the following
four points: 1) the final deal did not include purchasing the privately-owned
units; 2) the loan amount was only $3,750,000, but The Massachusetts
Government Land Bank provided a second mortgage for $2,500,000.18 3)
MHFA honored the RDAL commitment at $165,000 per year with FAF
money; and 4) MHFA allowed some less conservative assumptions, mainly
higher rents (although the operating budget was increased) in the pro forma
projections (See Exhibit 3).
According to Mike Jacobs, Senior Development Officer at MHFA and a
key player in the negotiations, there were many reasons for MHFA's new po-
16 Noted in conversations at MHFA with Mike Jacobs, Senior Development Officer, Shirley
Abrams, Development Officer, and Nancy Andersen, Development Officer. August 27, 1992.
1 7 judith W. Richards, Fundamentals of Development Finance; A Practitioners Guide (New
York: Praeger: New York), p. 22.
18The MHFA loan was financed at a taxable rate of 10% plus a .5% Agency administrative fee
for 30 years. Since then, credit enhanced rates have decreased to 6.75% for tax exempt and 8.5%
for taxable, plus the Agency's administrative fee.
sition. 19 As noted earlier, MHFA was interested in REO properties as a new
market. Mary Padula, the Secretary of the Executive Office of Communities
and Development (EOCD) also urged that MHFA honor Broadway Tower's
RDAL commitment because the contract had already been executed before
funding was terminated.
Additionally, Fannie Mae changed its position on purchasing the loan
from MHFA. When Winn first approached MHFA, Fannie Mae was hesitant
to purchase Broadway Tower's mortgage because it did not control all the
units. By the time Winn went to Concord, Fannie Mae had still not found
any actual guidelines for dealing with the uncontrolled units and decided it
could still purchase the mortgage.
From an underwriting standpoint, the Agency does not normally un-
derwrite deals based on HUD's 'fair market rents.' 20 Therefore, rent levels are
subject to adjustment. In order to satisfy both EOCD and MHFA's desire to try
the REO market, MHFA staff accepted Winn's projections, but required addi-
tional security to protect MHFA. The additional security included letters of
credit equivalent to 12% of the loan (6% is normal), personal guarantees, the
higher operating budget, and a $2.5 million loan from the Massachusetts
Government Land Bank in second position.21 (See Exhibit 4.) That is, MHFA's
mortgage in first position meant that if the property ever experienced difficul-
ties managing its debt, the MHFA mortgage would have to be fulfilled before
19The following rationale for MHFA's concessions were largely taken from a conversation with
Mike Jacobs, Senior Development Officer, September 16, 1992.
2 0Fair market rents (FMRs) are rents that HUD has determined are typical or attainable for a
particular statistical area. FMR is the level up to which HUD will subsidize federally
assisted tenants.
21The Land Bank, another quasi-public, was in part able to accept a riskier position than
MHFA because its financing does not come from bond issues or investors. MHFA may issue only
the highest investment grade bonds to finance its projects.
any other debt received payment. The new deal received final commitment
from MHFA's Board of Directors on March 10, 1992.
(6) CONCLUSION AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE REACH PROGRAM
In the case of Broadway Tower, an experienced developer rejected the
MHFA's prohibitive conditions, found a more competitive mortgage com-
pany, and was forced back to MHFA only when the State withdrew a critical
subsidy that only MHFA could replace.
The key point in this case is that the developer could easily have found
a comparable, more easily obtained mortgage to replace REACH financing at a
standard mortgage company, but the deal was not feasible without the operat-
ing subsidy. (See Exhibit 7) In fact, MHFA's taxable financing rates are gener-
ally recognized as not competitive with those of many conventional mort-
gage companies - though MHFA's low, tax-exempt financing rates are not
offered by conventional mortgage companies. 22 Without MHFA's unconven-
tional provision of the RDAL substitute, however, the lower acquisition cost
alone would not have made the deal feasible and the deal would not have ex-
isted.
Therefore, it is difficult to estimate REACH's costs and benefits to the
deal. Many people at MHFA feel that the true costs of doing business with the
Agency are hidden in the Agency's higher management and maintenance
standards, extra monitoring and audit requirements, additional equal oppor-
tunity standards, high security requirements, and limited dividend restric-
tions.23 Two factors, however, eliminate the cost issue: 1) the other subsidy
22Conversation with Development Officer at MHFA, August 11, 1992. In order to qualify for
tax-exempt financing rates a development may use no more than 5% of gross space for
commercial uses. Additionally, in the case of rehabilitated developments, the level of
rehabilitation work must exceed $15,000 per unit.
23 Ibid.
components included in each of Winn's mortgage proposals and critical to
the deal imposed use restrictions equal or greater than those of the REACH
program; and 2) the deal had to be financed at MHFA because of the RDAL
substitute, not REACH. The case of Broadway Tower is more useful in illu-
minating two emerging trends in housing development at MHFA: new un-
derwriting standards for REO properties, and MHFA's competitiveness in the
REO market.
As we saw with Broadway Tower, the composition of development
deals is changing at MHFA. As a relatively new, existing development,
Broadway Tower, and many REO properties, do not fit the characteristics of
most multi-family developments: expiring use projects, substantial rehabilita-
tion, or new construction. In addition, REOs may not stand up to MHFA
standards for construction, location, or design. They do not meet financial
feasibility standards without creative packages: REO properties by definition
have demonstrated infeasibility and need more assistance.
Broadway Tower highlights the need for new, less conventional un-
derwriting standards, creative financing packages, and relatively expedited
processing. These are the criteria for competitiveness that MHFA must meet
in its REO program. In the case of Broadway Tower, MHFA clearly did not
meet these criteria when the deal was first proposed and Winn Development
went elsewhere. Furthermore, the REACH program only offers developers
financing for the acquisition cost agreed to by the entities holding the proper-
ties: banks, the FDIC, or the RTC. Clearly, this reduced cost may not provide
an adequate subsidy for feasibility. Given, then, that MHFA offers no advan-
tage in terms of acquisition costs, the following chapters seek to answer two
questions to evaluate the REACH program: Does MHFA need more agressive
underwriting standards for REO properties? And are MHFA's financing op-
tions adequate, and comparable or better than those of other mortgage com-
panies?
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(1) INTRODUCTION
This thesis has tried to highlight two key questions for analyzing the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency's REACH program for financing REO
properties:
- Is REACH appropriate and useful for the existing market?
e Is REACH competitive with similar programs targeted at the same
market?
This chapter considers the second question. It examines loan products similar
to REACH, offered directly from the Resolution Trust Corporation, banks,
traditional mortgage companies, and other quasi-public housing organiza-
tions such as the Massachusetts Housing Partnership.1
Each of these types of institutions, like MHFA, has expressed interest in
financing foreclosed properties, though the focus and motivation vary in
each organization. Banks, for example, must deal with REO properties to
strengthen their own balance sheets and profit margins. Quasi-public institu-
tions, such as MHFA, may be concerned about profits, but are also influenced
by strong social mandates. Typically, quasi-public institutions require an af-
fordable housing component in exchange for 'competitive' or expedited fi-
nancing or other features.
1Quasi-public institutions in Massachusetts are generally created by the legislature to fulfill a
public need not being met by the private sector. The organizations are generally considered
quasi-public because of their ability to issue bonds and raise their own funds.
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to compare REACH with the
products of other institutions and assess its relative competitiveness.
Specifically, I will compare program features, restrictions, and market seg-
ments associated with the loans from both the borrower and lender perspec-
tive.
REACH's underwriting standards build on its less successful predeces-
sor, READI, which also targetted foreclosed and distressed properties.2 Among
READI's biggest problems, however, were a premature launch and a low pri-
ority status. The launch may have come before the real estate industry had
recognized the magnitude of the REO problem.
MHFA launched REACH, on the other hand, on the heels of the
Massachusetts Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy, which identi-
fied REO properties as a top priority in the state, hired an aggressive program
director, and began an exclusive direct-mail marketing campaign to alert se-
lected developers of the opportunity. This new campaign has already gener-
ated interest among several developers with proposals in hand.
REACH's program concept is as follows:
MHFA's ability to provide acquisition, rehabilitation and long-term
debt financing in a single underwriting provides a unique opportunity
to utilize bank-and-government-held housing resources. For qualified
projects and borrowers, below-market tax-exempt financing used in
conjunction with low-income housing tax credits and discounted ac-
quisition costs can provide a cost-effective financing package with little
or no state or local subsidies.3
REACH's fixed interest rate as of July 1992 was 6.75% for tax-exempt financing
and 8.5% for taxable. (Only projects that fulfill one of the Federal
2 READY-Rental Acquisition Development Initiative-was launched in 1990 to provide below
market-rate tax-exempt acquisition and rehabilitation financing for older, at-risk rental
properties or partially completed new developments. It also recognized that the softening
Massachusetts real estate market had left many of these developments infeasible.
3REACH General Information Brochure, July 1992.
Government's criteria for public purpose qualify to be financed through tax-
exempt bonds. Affordable housing is one of the qualified public purposes.)
Mortgages are capped at a 90% loan-to-value ratio and owners must reserve at
least 20% of the development's units for low-income households for at least
30 years. The rents of the units reserved for low-income families may not rise
above 30% of 50% of the geographic area's median income as determined by
HUD.4
Finally, MHFA seeks development proposals that satisfy the following
criteria in their lending programs in general:
1. Location in geographic areas that continue to experience high levels
of need for affordable housing relative to supply;
2. Sensitivity to particular housing needs in the contexts of local de-
mand, such as families, elders, persons with mental or physical dis-
abilities, single parents, the homeless, or minority households;
3. Permanent expansion of the supply of affordable housing in conjunc-
tion with efforts to create or preserve jobs, or to revitalize urban
neighborhoods or rural areas;
4. Strong community support, private sector participation, and/or cre-
ative use of financial and human resources.
From the above features and the lack of a distinct subsidy or special
underwriting guidelines, we can conclude that REACH is not a 'program.' It is
more a willingness to consider using MHFA financing to acquire properties
that might be technically REO, but basically conform to MHFA program stan-
dards.
(2) THE RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION
The Resolution Trust Corporation was created by the government under the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to
4 1n some cases, Section 8 certificates-a federal program where the government pays the
difference between 30% of the certificate holder's income and the market rate rent-may be
counted towards the 20% low income units.
dispose of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insured
bank properties. The RTC differs conceptually from MHFA in the public pur-
pose of the institution. Though the federal government has mandated that a
portion of these assets be allocated to non-profit and public institutions for af-
fordable housing, the RTC is also is also concerned with maximizing its re-
turn on the properties. MHFA's sole purpose is to create affordable housing.
The original strategy of the FDIC and the RTC was to offer direct sales,
refinancing and auction programs to developers. The response, however, was
largely negative due to the RTC's widely perceived bureaucracy, misman-
agement, and discrimination against non-profits and public agencies. The dis-
crimination stemmed from the original requirement of a 30% down payment
on RTC properties, which affordable housing entities had trouble meeting.
The RTC then created the Affordable Housing Disposition Program, a
special option for direct sales to public agencies and non-profit organizations.
This program is similar to REACH in that its goal is to create affordable hous-
ing, but REACH also targets private developers willing to accommodate an af-
fordable housing component. Under this option, the RTC offers permanent,
market rate, seller financing for up to 95% of a property's acquisition price.
The program requires at least 35% of all units in a multifamily apartment
building to be reserved for low and very low-income residents with incomes
below 80% and 50% of area median income respectively.
According to Barbara Bryan, an officer with the National Association of
Home builders, the revised underwriting for public agencies and non-profits
doubled the annual participation rate of the Affordable Housing Disposition
Program from 100 to 200 properties purchased. 5 More organizations have
been able to purchase properties directly from the RTC since the changes were
5 Conversation with Barbara Bryan, National Association of Homebuilders, 9/28/92.
implemented. In addition, for nonprofit developers, the underwriting process
only takes approximately 150 days, as compared with 180-200 for other quali-
fied buyers.6 (See Exhibit 8.)
These features also highlight a significant difference between the RTC's
program and REACH: the level of program standardization. As a regional
lender, MHFA tries to cultivate relationships with the development teams of
its projects. MHFA is likely to take each developer's experience, especially
with the Agency, heavily into account in the transaction. For example, MHFA
competitions for subsidies award points to more experienced developers. And
it was the developer's track record with the Agency that helped Broadway
Tower finally come to agreement with MHFA. Each deal is open to negotia-
tion for security and mortgage amount, and interest rates are influenced by
the need for credit enhancement, and tax status. Finally, as noted in the in-
troduction, MHFA has explicit community goals that are never addressed by
the RTC.
Both of these programs, as well as those of other quasi-public agencies,
however, differ from conventional mortgage companies. We examine the
REO situation in banks, mortgage companies and other quasi-public housing
agencies in the next two sections.
(3) BANKS AND TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE COMPANIES
Private banks have generally had three responses to the significant number of
bad real estate loans left in their portfolios by the depressed real estate market
and imprudence of the 80s:
6RTC brochure: Direct Sales Program for Public Agencies and Nonprofit Organizations;
Affordable Housing Disposition Program.
1. Offer individual foreclosed properties at reduced acquisition prices;
2. Auction non-performing assets to the public.
3. Package foreclosed properties, with healthy and non-performing
mortgages, at deeply discounted prices to investment entities.
The first strategy has been tried by almost every entity holding an REO prop-
erty to discover what price the market will bear. This approach may have
been unsuccessful because a property's maximum supportable mortgage may
be much lower than the price banks are ready to accept.
The FDIC and RTC have both tried the second strategy, but still hold
large portfolios of multi-family housing properties as well. Now Shawmut
Bank is considering a large public auction for as many as 200 of its commercial
properties. 7
The last strategy, attempted by both the FDIC and Shawmut Bank in its
sale to GE Capital Corp. and Lehman Brothers, is interesting because it adds
another player to the REO market: investment bankers. 8 Arguably, invest-
ment banking firms, may be the best positioned to dispose of foreclosed real
estate because of their access to investors and ability to create financial prod-
ucts. Analysts, however, are divided as to the effect of wholesale packaging on
the real estate industry.
Whether they agree with the package sales strategy or not, most ana-
lysts concur that present conditions afford banks a unique opportunity
to clean up their books, a narrow window... that might close as quickly
as it opened. And no one denies that non-performing loans have a
number of negative consequences. 9
7Banker and Tradesman; "Lenders Rush to Dump Underwater Real Estate Loans." October 14,
1992.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 10.
Other analysts believe that the low prices will not clear the market, but
"depress market values generally, which in turn, will reduce the value of
other real estate assets the banks hold."10
Some private mortgage companies will also finance REO properties.
These lending institutions differ, however, in their relationships to the prop-
erties. Mortgage companies do not hold property and usually sell their mort-
gages in the secondary markets. Therefore, they are limited to refinancing
low risk properties in order to sell the mortgage to an institution such as
Fannie Mae. Mortgage brokers seek to match developers with loan programs,
but also only for top investment grade properties. In other words, REO, fore-
closed properties would require additional credit enhancement, security or
higher rates to reflect the risk involved.
Additionally, mortgage companies usually have no social investment
obligations. When deals include other subsidies, however, then the structure
must conform to requirements of other programs, as we saw in Chapter 2
when Winn brought Broadway Tower to the Concord Mortgage Company.
The development's participation in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
Program, the RDAL program, as well as Fannie Mae's purchase of the mort-
gage required many conditions on affordability, regardless of the conven-
tional mortgage.
(4) THE QUASI-PUBLIC AND HOUSING FINANCE ORGANIZATIONS
In Massachusetts, two quasi-public state agencies offer financing for REO
properties in addition to MHFA:
1. The Massachusetts Housing Partnership (MHP)
2. The Massachusetts Government Land Bank.
10Ibid.
In addition, several state housing finance agencies have begun offering pro-
grams for REO properties. Neither Massachusetts agency, nor any other state
agency, however, has a program or policy designed specifically for evaluating
multi-family REO properties. Nonetheless, it is important to consider
MHFA's closest competitors, MHP and the Land Bank, in order to assess more
accurately the supply and demand for REO financing, as well as strategies and
innovations.
The Massachusetts Housing Partnership
The Massachusetts Housing Partnership Fund is a quasi-public housing fi-
nance institution that specializes in the financing of smaller, multifamily de-
velopments, usually fewer than 20 units. Fleet Bank has recently capitalized a
program in partnership with the MHP Fund, which will execute "a $63.7 mil-
lion loan agreement to provide financing for affordable housing across the
Commonwealth." 11 As at MHFA, affordability means that the rents of units
reserved for low-income families may not rise above 30% of 50% of the geo-
graphic area's median income as determined by HUD.
Though MHP's program does not apply exclusively to REO properties,
REOs clearly fall within the guidelines:
Over eighty percent of the private rental housing stock in
Massachusetts cities consists of smaller buildings of 20 units or less....
These properties are usually investor owned and are therefore particu-
larly vulnerable to disinvestment during tough economic times.
Disinvestment occurs when landlords default on their mortgage or tax
payments and then walk away from their properties or lose them to
foreclosure. Currently, there are well over 5,000 abandoned, vacant,
and foreclosed multifamily rental properties in the state's larger cities,
and thousands more statewide. 12
11Fleet Bank/MHP Fund Loan Agreement Summary. July 28,1992.
12Massachusetts Housing Partnership Fund Brochure: Permanent Rental Financing Program.
1992.
In addition, MHP offers a credit enhancement waiver, coordination with
other lenders and equity sources, and "fast turn-around and sensible under-
writing":
The MHP Fund's lending standards have been designed to recognize
the special nature of affordable housing development and the often
limited resources of sponsors of affordable housing. While the Fund
will only finance credit-worthy projects, our standards are less restric-
tive than those imposed by conventional lenders. 13
MHP also believes that "the greatest affordable housing 'subsidy' cur-
rently available is the low price of existing stock. These discounts represent
the foundation for building the financing for an affordable project."'14 MHP
offers a maximum loan of $2 million, 20 year terms, and an interest rate set at
2.1% above Treasury yields of comparable maturities. They require a mini-
mum loan of $100,000, debt service coverage of 110% or 115% for projects with
fewer than 20 units, and a maximum loan to value ratio of 80%, though they
indicate flexibility. (See Exhibit 1).
To finance this program, Fleet provided long-term financing to the
Fund. Eligible uses consist of 20 year, fixed-rate loans by the MHP Fund for af-
fordable rental housing. There is a priority for 5-20 unit buildings in urban
neighborhoods that do not have other sources of permanent financing.
The Massachusetts Government Land Bank
The Massachusetts Government Land Bank is a quasi-public institution
funded by state issued bonds. Its purpose is to promote beneficial, affordable
housing and economic development in targeted regions of the
Commonwealth. More significantly, it provides financial, technical, and de-
velopment assistance to achieve its goals.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
The Massachusetts Government Land Bank is also an alternative
source of permanent financing for REO properties. As noted in Chapter 1, the
Land Bank provided the second mortgage for Broadway Tower. According to
Robert Baker, the Director of Development at the Land Bank, the quasi-public
institution does not actively pursue REO properties, but several developers
have approached the Land Bank, including BayBanks' REO department. The
Land Bank's policy, in general, is that the REO property must fit the Bank's
regular social and financial underwriting criteria. For this reason, the Bank
normally considers significantly different properties from the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency, i.e. the organizations distinguish themselves with
different affordable housing goals and by targeting different kinds of projects.
Chart A: Land Bank vs. MHFA
Eligible Uses for Financing: Land Bank MHFA
Housing:
Multifamily Housing Yes Yes
Limited Equity Coops Yes Occasionally
Single Family Homes No Yes
Single Room Occupancy Yes Occasionally
Transitional Housing Yes No
20-40 Units Yes Occasionally
> 40 Units Occasionally Yes
Economic Development:
Industrial Parks Yes No
Industrial Buildings Yes No
Small Business Incubators Yes No
Downtown Commercial Buildings Yes No
Other Uses:
Technical Assistance for Yes Yes
feasibility studies
More specifically, the Land Bank currently offers mortgages on afford-
able housing up to $2.5 million. Rates vary depending on public benefits,
need, term, and risk, but average 7% over 15 years, with an amortization pe-
riod of 30 years. The Land Bank requires a minimum of 10% of total devel-
opment costs in equity, a maximum loan to value ratio of 90%, minimum
debt service coverage of 1.10 and matching financing from a private lender on
loans over $1,000,000. In addition, security requirements typically include pro-
ject real estate, a senior mortgage or shared first mortgage, and maybe assets of
the developer. 15 The Land Bank also has a development arm to act as a part-
ner in carrying out development tasks or as developer.
It is an important characteristic, however, that in the case of REOs both
organizations have proved more flexible in their criteria. MHFA, for exam-
ple, has expressed an interest in accommodating smaller developments than
average. And the Land Bank financed the 92 unit Broadway Tower, which is
larger than their usual 50 unit maximum.
In order to compare the various features of MHP's and Land Banks' fi-
nancing to REACH, I used the following general assumptions under each
program's terms (See also Exhibit 9 and the summary in Chart B):
Assumptions: Mortgage $2,000,000
Equity $200,000
Per unit cost $50,000
Number of units 44
At MHP, this mortgage would result in one-time financing fees of ap-
proximately $22,500. Their current 9.5% interest rate would require monthly
debt service of $16,817. Collateralizing the 6% letter of credit would also be a
one-time payment of $120,000.
15MHFA "One-Stop" Affordable Housing Finance Application Instructions. September 1, 1992.
p. 19.
At the Land Bank, this mortgage would generate between $10,000 and
$50,000 in fees (assume upper limit for extended REO due diligence). The 7%
interest rate would require $13,306 in monthly debt service. The operating re-
serve at 35% of the annual operating budget plus 3% of monthly income was
estimated as follows:
Budget 44 units @ $5000/unit = $220,000
$220,000 x .35 = $77,000
Income 44 units @ $750/unit = $33,000
$33,000 x .03 = $990
Total Reserve $77,990
The same project financed with REACH would require $56,000 in one-
time Agency fees (2.8% for construcion and permanent financing) and
$120,000 to collateralize a letter of credit. The mortgage would generate $13,038
in monthly debt service at 6.8% (6.75 + .05 Agency Adminitrative Fee). 16
(Although both MHFA and Land Bank offer below market-rate financing,
each changes its own financing rate based on market conditions. Each organi-
zation makes this decision based on the discretion of internal financial offi-
cers without collaborating with other agencies.)
16This analysis is simplified and for illustration only. It was confirmed as typical of actual
calculations conducted at MHFA by Shirley Abrams, Development Officer at the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, December 2, 1992.
Chart B: Comparison of Financing Fees
MHP Land Bank MHFA
Monthly DS $16,817 $13,306 $13,038
One-time Fees $22,500 $50,000 $56,000
LOC/Reserve $120,000 $77,990 $120,000
Total Fees and
Reserves $142,500 $127,990 $176,000
This chart shows that, except for slightly higher reserve requirements, the
Land Bank offers a better financing deal than MHFA.
Other Housing Finance Agencies
In order to put MHFA's REO efforts in a national perspective, I in-
quired of the activities of other state housing finance agencies. According to
the National Council of State Housing Finance Agencies, several other states
have begun offering financing programs for REO properties, including the
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, the Oklahoma
Housing Finance Agency, the Missouri Housing Development Commission,
and the Mississippi Home Corporation. All but the Mississippi Home
Corporation offer financing exclusively for single family REO properties as a
way to provide affordable home ownership. The Mississippi Home
Corporation does not offer any REO financing and merely acts as a informa-
tion clearinghouse for RTC and FDIC properties. 17 Thus it is clear that MHFA
has a more developed and focused strategy for the State's non-performing as-
set problem than any other state housing finance agency.
17National Council of State Housing Authorities. HFA Program Catalogue; Section H:
RTC/FHA/HFA REOs.
(5) CONCLUSION AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR REACH
This chapter reviewed several financing sources for developers interested in
acquiring REO properties. It is clear that the viable options for obtaining fi-
nancing are limited. MHFA is one of the very few financing sources in
Massachusetts that have expressed an interest in REO. Apparently, the lim-
ited supply of financing programs has kept MHFA from assembling a truly
useful or effective package for REACH. Use restrictions, high financing fees
and a lack of subsidy or incentive all decrease the attractiveness for develop-
ers to take a chance on A risky REO property. We can conclude initially that
although MHFA has expressed more interest in REO than other finance insti-
tutions, it has not really endeavored to create a useful package. To further
assess whether MHFA's program has the potential to capture the growing
REO market, the next chapter examines the development community's re-
sponse to REACH. First, however, it is worth clarifying why any lender would
be interested in financing REO properties.
Lender Interest
The need for additional subsidies to insure REO viability and financial re-
turns, raises an important question: Why would a lender want to get in-
volved with this type of risk? This chapter has dealt substantially with the in-
terests of the borrower. It is worth examining the motivation of the lenders
for clues to understanding how the non-performing asset crisis will play out.
The motivation for banks is obvious. There is increasing pressure for
banks to dispose of their non-performing assets in order to strengthen their
balance sheets and their ability to do business. I believe this pressure has lead
to the drastic measure of dumping billions of dollars of foreclosed mortgages
on the market in the hopes of starting over.
Quasi-public organizations with social purposes, however, seek to ful-
fill other goals. The past two chapters have underscored the changing devel-
opment climate of multifamily housing in Massachusetts. Financing has be-
come scarcer and more complicated. This trend has driven quasi-public len-
ders as well as developers to consider new financing programs and opportu-
nities in order to stimulate the development industry.
Housing professionals at MHFA have taken note of these changes and
have strived to keep the agency on the cutting edge of housing finance. Such
recent programs and initiatives to increase the Agency's flexibility include
Elder CHOICE for elderly residents that need additional services to continue
independent living; Options for Independence for mentally disabled and
other special needs populations, and the Small Projects Task force to help the
Agency better accommodate developments with fewer than 40 units.
Many housing professionals now view REOs as the next frontier in af-
fordable housing. A supply of empty, existing housing and the chronic need
for a variety of affordable housing options seem to be a natural match. The
scarcity of financing and the downturn in the real estate market have also led
lenders to seek additional business in the form of targeted new programs. A
program that can successfully service the REO market will likely enjoy a busy
market in the near future.
Thus, in this thesis' attempt to analyze the REACH initiative, we have
seen that MHFA is in a favorable position to tap the REO market, and there
are several incentives to do so. But over the past 8 months, MHFA has not
been able to create a program to stimulate significant demand. The next chap-
ter examines MHFA's actual attempts to enter the REO market and analyzes
some of the lessons learned from initial experiences.
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(1) INTRODUCTION
As noted earlier in this thesis, in the 1980s, Massachusetts's real estate
industry experienced a cyclical upturn concurrent with the excitement on
Wall Street. Developers continued to build commercial and residential
properties, regardless of the vacancy absorption capacity and demand for types
of uses in geographic areas. Then, the 1990's recession brought an unpar-
alleled slump to the real estate market. Years of over-building in the 'good
times' finally came back to haunt the over-zealous bankers and developers.
Foreclosed condominiums and multifamily developments throughout the
state stand incomplete, vacant, or in need of extensive capital improvements.
These REOs are generally held by the Federal Depositors Insurance Company
(FDIC), the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), and various private banks in
Massachusetts.
Despite the existence of the market, and the lack of available finance
options for REO, MHFA's attempts to stimulate demand through the REACH
program, fewer than 15 proposals have come through MHFA and only 2-3 are
likely to receive financing. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to
examine the REACH initiative, market, and the possible reasons for the
disappointingly low response rate.
(2) THE REACH MARKET
The potential REACH market includes all the multifamily, foreclosed
properties of the FDIC, RTC, and ailing banks of Massachusetts. According to
the Citizens' Housing and Planning Agency (CHAPA), this market contains
approximately 300-400 properties in Massachusetts and should increase as
more bankers and developers come forward with troubled properties in
search of opportunities.
The market should represent opportunity for MHFA because the FDIC
and RTC have an affordable housing mandate. The mandate was imposed by
the Federal Government to facilitate the potential public good the properties
can provide. Briefly, it states that the FDIC and the RTC must first offer single
and multi-family properties that fall below a certain percentage of their
original value to preferred buyers, including households with income below
115% of area median, first time home buyers, and non-profit developers. In
addition, buyers purchase the properties for their appraised value with low-
income use restrictions. Supposedly, the Federal Government was to
reimburse the FDIC the difference between this value and their (higher)
value without the restrictions. 1 The MHFA, therefore, is an ideal partner for
the RTC because of its experience in the affordable housing community.
In light of MHFA's competitive position, the Agency should be poised
for brisk business. Based on conversations with officers in the Multifamily
Development Department of the MHFA, the experience of Broadway Tower,
the lists of available REO properties, and interviews with developers, there
are four key areas where the REACH program strategy may not have
anticipated the reality of the REO market.
*The Dog Factor
1The status of this funding for multi-family properties is currently unclear.
*MHFA Underwriting Standards
*Program Marketing
*The Wholesale Phenomenon
(3) THE DOG FACTOR
Many Massachusetts real estate professionals agree that their industry has
been in decline since 1987. In spite of the large potential market, MHFA's
small REACH portfolio may simply reflect the difficult nature of REACH
projects. From the Agency's perspective, to obtain REACH financing, a
development must overcome the inherent liabilities that caused foreclosure
initially, meet the Agency's stringent design and feasibility criteria, and
provide well-conceived affordable housing. The REACH financing terms
must then satisfy the developer, owner, or bank. These requirements are
rigorous for any development in a sluggish economy, but especially for the
less favorable REACH projects, or dogs.
Many of the multifamily properties built in the real estate boom of the
eighties have significant, inherent liabilities. For example, mortgages were
optimistically based on high rent levels with little cushion if rents ever fell.
Bargain-hunting developers may have purchased any properties that were
still in reasonable condition when acquired by a bank and with any chance for
operating at a profit due to the lower acquisition or financing costs.
Some failed condominiums contain an abundance of luxury amenities,
or are located in wealthy suburbs. Converting these failed condominiums and
luxury units into affordable housing may not be a cost-effective strategy if the
units require large subsidies, or more than HUD will support for fair market
rents. MHFA's Appraisal and Marketing Department's criteria, for instance,
include the desirability of the location and attractiveness of the property, en-
vironmental quality, and proximity to civil, social, transportation and com-
mercial services. MHFA's Design Department's criteria include architectural
impact/appropriateness, energy conservation, and design for efficient operat-
ing costs. Condominiums may also have financial structures that necessitate
more due diligence or concessions than other mortgages. MHFA underwrit-
ing will certainly flag inflated soft costs that can easily break fragile deals.
MHFA's social program goals also limit the number of suitable deve-
lopments. Housing program concepts have increasingly stressed the impor-
tance of an economic development component or another social goal beyond
providing shelter, and REACH is not exempt. MHFA's award-winning Inner
City Task Force is a prime example of a housing social component. Tenants,
police patrollers, housing managers, community organizers, and youth
leaders strategize with MHFA to combat comprehensively chronic urban
problems, and protect MHFA's investment.
In addition to the above underwriting standards, the ideal REACH
project must reserve 20% of the total units as affordable to families that earn
less than 50% of the area's median income - the Agency's minimum criteria.
The project must also meet more expansive program guidelines to hold up
under public scrutiny, including appropriate siting and design, and access to
public transportation and amenities. Developers must demonstrate at least a
concept for integrated affordable housing. In fact, the REO properties' external
economic impact is one of their greatest selling points to the State and the
public:
Utilization of these properties can aid in the recovery of the
Commonwealth's lending institutions, generate employment
opportunities, and enhance neighborhood revitalization efforts. 2
2 MHFA Information: Recovery Through the Acquisition of Housing (REACH); p. 1. 1992.
Though the Agency prefers new financial products that stem the
decline of a neighborhood or positively influence the maintenance and
longevity of surrounding properties, as well as cover the agency's costs
associated with financing, it is not evident that these characteristics are
present in REO portfolios. In the past five years, banks and developers have
been working creatively to salvage the over-abundance of residential
properties, particularly luxury and .condominium units, of the 1980s boom
years. It is popular belief that the properties remaining in banks' and the
RTC's portfolio are the most difficult to make viable in our present economy.
According to Charles Gladstone, the development officer coordinating
REACH at MHFA, fewer than 20 proposals have been submitted to the
Agency for review since the program inception in June, 1992. This low
number may reflect several macro-conditions: developers have been scared or
put out of business by the difficult economic climate and trouble finding
investors; many banks leery of more real estate exposure have already
discouraged developers from borrowing to develop; developers have rejected
REO projects because of the high risks and low incentives.
There are currently 15 REACH projects under review at MHFA, but Mr.
Gladstone's initial estimate is that only 2 or 3 of the projects would be able to
support the debt service on even the reduced acquisition prices. This
condition supports the theory that the available REO properties are so poorly
conceived as investments, that they cannot even support their own mortgage
and maintenance costs, or a worthwhile return for investors. Mr. Gladstone
has subsequently submitted a proposal to the Agency's management to
consider providing subsidy in the form of equity or subordinate debt.
(4) MHFA UNDERWRITING STANDARDS
The second reason for MHFA's limited pipeline of REACH projects may be
MHFA's conventional underwriting standards. Three incidents provide
evidence for this theory: Broadway Tower, the Small Projects Task Force, and
MHFA's perceived niche and reputation in affordable housing.
Chapter 2's case study of Broadway Tower outlined the project's
problems with feasibility, including MHFA's hesitance to provide a mortgage
for the property when three of the units were privately owned
condominiums (as well as the need for an operating subsidy.) MHFA's
insistence that Arthur Winn conform the first proposal to meet conventional
underwriting standards drove Winn to seek alternative financing.
MHFA's very first filter for identifying potential properties, in fact, is
that all the units be included in the deal. A review of the RTC's listing of
available properties, however, indicates that many of the multifamily
condominiums include only a fraction of the units.
MHFA's second filter is typically the size of the property. The Agency
has historically been reluctant to finance properties smaller than thirty units
due to disproportionate risk and costs involved with bond financing and
underwriting, according to findings of The Small Projects Task Force. 3 A
review of the RTC's properties, however, again indicates an abundance of
properties under forty units. Though MHFA has initiated, through the Small
Projects Task Force, an effort to address a market shift towards smaller
affordable housing developments, the incremental changes suggested to
underwriting do not create a vehicle for financing the volume of small
projects suggested by the REO market.
3The inter-departmental Task Force was assembled by MHFA management to investigate the
risk and costs associated with financing small projects.
The final underwriting filter is the outside perception MHFA has
cultivated in the housing market. Based on anonymous interviews with
developers, MHFA is known in the development community as being
professional, but rigorous, demanding, and bureaucratic. MHFA also has an
acknowledged reputation for discouraging small project proposals. This belief
may have contributed to the segmentation of the market, as evidenced by the
Massachusetts Government Land Bank target of properties between 20 and 40
units and the Massachusetts Housing Partnership target of properties smaller
than 20 units.
This evidence strongly suggests that MHFA has limited its own
pipeline by not recognizing the characteristics of the existing market. In
addition, MHFA has not made any attempts through program literature or
outreach to change perceptions that the Agency is now kinder, friendlier, and
more willing to accept less conventional (smaller) projects.
(5) PROGRAM MARKETING
Six months after REACH's official launch, only 15 projects are in the pipeline
and few seem viable. We have discussed the possible impact of the projects'
inherent liabilities and MHFA's high standard of underwriting. The next
questions concern the effectiveness of MHFA's marketing of the program:
1) Did MHFA's advertising attempts reach enough developers?
2) Did the direct mail campaign fail to convey the benefits of the program,
the competitive advantages of MHFA, or the Agency's attempts to
accommodate new kinds of projects?
The REACH program was released after a less-successful predecessor.
The original program was also to target REO properties, but was given no
special priority or attention at MHFA. When the Agency's management met
with RTC officials and decided to make REO a priority in the next year, the
Multifamily Development Department redesigned the READI program into
REACH. The Agency hired an aggressive program director (Charles
Gladstone) to spearhead the initiative and launch a direct-mail campaign to
over 1000 developers, bankers, and brokers in the Massachusetts real estate
community.
The REACH brochure mailing was the largest effort at MHFA to
inform developers of the program. The REACH brochure is two pages: the
first page is General Information about Program Objective, Background, and
Program Concept; the second page is a term sheet with mortgage rates,
amortization, loan-to-value ratios and other information. The two-color
brochure was widely expected, at MHFA, to initiate an avalanche of
development proposals. (See Exhibit 10.)
Other strategies to inform the real estate community included a
newspaper advertisement in Banker and Tradesman, the region's largest real
estate trade newspaper, and the program director's personal conversations
with developers (word of mouth).
In retrospect, it is important to compare the marketing of REACH to
the marketing of other MHFA initiatives. The SHARP program was MHFA's
last widespread, well-received, affordable housing initiative. SHARP was a
State initiative to fill the gaps created by the demise of the federal Section 8
program which provided developers deep subsidies and guaranteed rent
levels. It was launched by the governor who had assembled a diverse task
force of esteemed housing professionals to create the program. MHFA then
held developer workshops to familiarize the real estate community with the
program. Both the State and MHFA generated press releases, advertisements
and mailings.
Several differences between the SHARP and REACH launches are
immediately obvious:
1. SHARP was State sponsored by and carried the blessings (and clout) of
the Governor's Office.
2. SHARP's subsidy in the booming 1980s was an attractive proposition for
developers.
3. SHARP was created by a diverse task force that represented the interests
of developers and lenders.
4. SHARP's launch included more marketing efforts, such as developer
workshops and press releases.
MHFA has had similar experiences with other federal programs. In
fact, most of MHFA's lending is associated with popular federally subsidized
programs such as Section 8, 236, and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, or
State initiatives such as SHARP and RDAL, though individual descriptions of
these programs are beyond the scope of this thesis. The recently initiated
MHFA programs, READI, 80/20, REACH, Elder CHOICE for Independence, on
the other hand, have financed fewer than 10 developments combined.
Apparently, independent MHFA programs may lack the required subsidy and
momentum provided by national organizations, media, and cooperation.
Moreover, closer critique of the brochure itself reveals several other
possible weaknesses. The General Information page is long and dense. The
information given emphasizes foremost the liabilities of the projects, "such
properties are generally characterized by high vacancy rates and financial
unfeasibility" and the Agency's larger social goals served by the program:
In addition to providing an opportunity to increase the supply of
affordable rental housing, utilization of these properties can aid in the
recovery of the Commonwealth's lending institutions, generate
employment opportunities, and enhance neighborhood revitalization
efforts.
Not until the third paragraph, in Program Concept, does the brochure
mention some of the benefits of the program:
MHFA's ability to provide acquisition, rehabilitation and long-term
debt financing in a single underwriting provides a unique opportunity
to utilize bank- and government-held housing resources. For qualified
projects and borrowers, below-market tax-exempt financing used in
conjunction with low-income housing tax credits and discounted
acquisition costs can provide a cost-effective financing package with
little or no state or local subsidies.
The remainder of the brochure outlines MHFA requirements and
prioritization of projects with a high likelihood for socio-economic impact.
The brochure suggests that the content was not written with MHFA's
largest customer-struggling private developers looking for business and
profits-in mind. If they took the time to read the entire brochure, they were
mainly informed of MHFA's social criteria and many requirements. MHFA's
second most prevalent customer is non-profit developers, who might share
MHFA's social vision, but also feel daunted by MHFA's underwriting
standards. In fact, the brochure may serve to perpetuate MHFA's reputation
for difficult standards and extensive requirements for documentation.
The brochure's failure to entice gun-shy developers becomes especially
evident when it is compared to a private mortgage broker's literature. The
broker's advertisement utilizes more pictures, exclamation points, graphics,
and differentiating font styles. (See Exhibit 11.) It emphasizes only one thing:
how low financing rates are: "If you're waiting for rates to bottom out, we
believe it's time to get off the fence!!! ...lowest point in over two decades." It
speaks directly to the development community about the willingness of
financial institutions to negotiate deals. Inside the four-page folder are clear
charts with bold print. Two of the pages also list contact names for more
information, which adds a personal touch to the advertisement. Thus the
clarity, enthusiasm, and personal touches create an enticing and effective
marketing tool.
(6) THE WHOLESALE PHENOMENON
A final explanation for the lack of response to the REACH program may lie in
the announcement of a new strategy created by banks and the RTC: wholesale
packaging of millions of dollars of non-performing residential mortgages and
REOs for sale to investment banking houses and secondary markets. If this
approach is successful, it may indicate that any one typical REO mortgage is
too risky for investors, but slices of bundles of mortgages with varying risk
levels and carefully allocated cashflows may be more enticing to investors,
especially if they stand to gain from an upswing in the market.
The RTC and FDIC have been disposing of their properties both
through auctions and individual sales. Many banks have tried creative
financing with developers to salvage REO properties and value including
debt restructuring, reduced acquisition costs, and partnerships with public and
quasi-public institutions to create affordable housing. REACH is another
attempt to heal individual properties by restructuring their financing. This
approach might have eventually worked except that the staggering volume of
REO properties in Massachusetts alone is surpassed only by the number of
underwriting and workout hours required to restructure them. CHAPA has
estimated between 300 and 400 RTC, FDIC, and bank held properties, not
including properties that sick banks have not yet announced.
Some banks, such as Shawmut and Fleet Financial are beginning to
realize that a more significant, and maybe drastic, solution is required.
According to Banker and Tradesman, First Chicago Corp., Fleet Financial
Group, and Nations Bank announced plans to sell over $3.2 billion of
distressed and bad commercial real estate loans.4 Shawmut Bank has already
signed a preliminary agreement to sell $75 million in non performing
residential real estate loans and foreclosed properties to GE Capital Corp. and
Lehman Brothers.5 And the FDIC is planning a similar package.
A package of REO mortgages might resemble a successful financial
product created from a package of junk bonds: Collateralized Bond
Obligations (CBOs). CBOs are credit worthy bonds mixed with junk bonds to
guarantee a stream of payments and average the credit worthiness of all the
bonds. Investors are interested in the cash flow, but are also betting on the
likelihood that the value of the junk will increase and their investment will
realize a capital gain in the secondary market. The main difference, however,
is that the mortgages are based on physical empty properties that still require
maintenance, development, and management as well as tenants to provide
an income stream. If the investment banks can resolve these issues and
interest investors, commercial banks might be willing to clear their balance
sheets of REOs once and for all.
The purpose of looking at this product is that it suggests that the
REACH program may be the wrong scale and approach to the REO dilemma.
Banks may be more interested in dumping the properties and freeing their
reserves than dabbling in affordable housing. In addition, a $75 - $200 million
sweep may be more cost effective in the long run for banks than individual
mortgages. If this is the case, it may be difficult for MHFA and developers to
get banks to focus on moving volumes of REOs into the affordable housing
arena. A better approach might be to pool resources with other quasi-publics
4 Banker and Tradesman; Oct. 14, 1992; "Lenders Rush to Dump Underwater Real Estate Loans";
p. 1.
5lbid., p. 10.
to purchase a package cheap and maintain it until an owner is found or the
market turns around. This approach and other potential strategies are
discussed in the Conclusion of this thesis.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) INTRODUCTION
(2) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
(3) OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1) INTRODUCTION
This thesis has examined the Real Estate Owned crisis in Massachusetts and the
attempts of the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency to address it. The current
industry downturn is largely the result of three factors:
" the over-zealous building of the 1980s and consequent glut of housing
properties
e the imprudent investing of banks and S&Ls and their consequent failures
" the current scarcity of credit.
MHFA saw the gap between existing multifamily housing and sources of
financing as an opportunity for the Agency. MHFA has a national reputation for
being the most financially sophisticated and innovative state housing finance
agency in the country. The REO crisis was an immediate opportunity to create
affordable housing, possibly more cheaply and efficiently, and lead the way for
other organizations with another housing innovation. The added bonus of high-
profile publicity from the Government, the RTC, and media was not a
coincidence. Turning foreclosed, empty properties into affordable housing, in the
words of MHFA's Deputy Director, was a "no-brainer."1
In the nine months that this thesis has observed MHFA's efforts to identify
and finance REO properties, however, only one deal, Broadway Tower, received
financing and only due to unusual circumstances. This thesis has documented
the trial-and-error development of the REACH program, as well as the virtually
simultaneous development of strategies at other financial institutions. In
1Based on a conversation with Eleanor White, Deputy Director, MHFA. 4/15/1992
hindsight, the Agency's efforts have been thwarted on many dimensions, from
competition to marketing to the inherent difficulties of REOs in a recessed
market. By looking at the problems from several angles, however, this analysis
has tried to suggest areas in which the Agency's efforts might be bolstered to
achiev its goals. The purpose of this Chapter and conclusion, therefore, is
twofold:
1. To summarize the insight gained from examining the REO market and
MHFA;
2. To raise new ideas, based on the below insights, for fulfilling the Agency's
commitment to affordable housing through the productive use of REO
properties.
(2) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Broadway Tower was MHFA's first experience with REO. Although the deal
closed, it provided several clues to the real disadvantages of the current REACH
model. Attention to these clues may help the Agency restructure future REO
financing programs. Broadway Tower's developer, Winn, an experienced and
influential affordable housing developer, approached MHFA with the proposal
over a year ago. MHFA's hesitation and excessive requirements, however, caused
Winn to take the deal to another mortgage company.
The lesson learned here was that foreclosed properties have characteristics
which differ from conventional deals that MHFA must accommodate if it wants
to enlarge its pipeline of properties, such as the three privately owned
condominiums in the Broadway Tower complex. Another lesson is that in a slow
development market MHFA must compete with other entities for business. The
Agency's expensive monitoring, negotiating, and requirements will cause
developers to look elsewhere for financing, or not take the risk.
When the RDAL program was cut and Broadway Tower was no longer
feasible, Winn came back to MHFA for assistance. This event highlights two
issues:
1. REO properties that have failed and may even have been refinanced, but are
still not financially viable, probably need an even deeper subsidy than the
current reduced acquisition price provides.
2. MHFA, with its impressive track record and excellent bond rating, is in a
good position to seek additional and less conventional subsidies.
After Broadway Tower's closing, MHFA launched the official REACH
program, MHFA's answer for REO. The program's primary objective was to
attract developers to the Agency with below-market tax-exempt rate financing
and reduced acquisition costs. In exchange, the developer would
1. identify a feasible property that complements the Agency's larger social
goals,
2. carry the inherent risks of developing an REO, and
3. provide low-rent, affordable housing in at least 20% of the total units.
In an effort to compare the REACH program with other programs,
Chapter 3 reviewed several other types of institutions that could be REACH's
competitors, including banks, mortgage companies, the RTC, and other
Massachusetts quasi-public housing finance agencies. In this review, I discovered
that MHFA was far beyond any other institution's development of a program to
rehabilitate individual properties.
Chapter III clearly identifies MHFA as more aggressive and more willing
to consider REOs that any other quasi-public or state housing finance agency. It
highlights these organizations' lack of inclination to pursue the REO market,
regardless of perceived differences in specialities or more competitive financing
fees.
Banks and the RTC, however, after limited success with refinancing- and
direct sales-type programs, have moved on to other strategies for disposing of
REOs, such as auctions and bulk sales. The appropriateness of bulk strategies
was elaborated on in Chapter IV. Radically different approaches could prove
significant competitors for MHFA. For example, a wholesale bulk sale to an
institutional investor, such as GM Capital Corporation, who could offer lower
acquisition prices, a selection of developments, and attractive financing, would
be a formidable opponent to MHFA's REACH program.
The potential benefits of an all-in-one institution for purchasing and
developing REOs are echoed by developers. Subsequent interviews with
Massachusetts affordable housing developers resound with the increasing
difficulties of finding financing. Developers have perceived two results of
affordable housing trends that the Agency has recognized, but not factored in to
the REACH program:
1. Financing availability drives development by influencing which projects a
developer will attempt.
2. Financing sources are often attached to individual developments long
before owners by the properties' feasible uses or community demand.
In other words, the ability to attain an attractive financing source will encourage
developers to seek the targeted property and then apply to the source. For
example, the State's prioritization of AIDS housing financing has stimulated
developers to seek developments appropriate for this population in order to
qualify for subsidy programs. In turn, developments that are selected by
communities for a particular use will also self-select the financing source.
This long interpretation indicates that a truly successful program would
stimulate developers to seek REO projects. Or, a connection to the developments
at an early stage in the marketing process would help establish MHFA as a
competitive financing source. Currently, the REACH program appears to achieve
neither and suggests that MHFA both restructure the program, or forge stronger
bonds with the source of the properties: the RTC and banks with large portfolios.
Chapter IV presents the strongest evidence for restructuring the REACH
program. Based on the RTC's sales of over $12 billion, Massachusetts banks' sales
of REO portfolios worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and a starving
development community's search for financing, a market for these properties
must exist. Then the question becomes, if MHFA has so few competitors, why is
the REACH pipeline so small? Chapter IV compiled several factors that may
have limited the MHFA pipeline and the Agency's ability to identify feasible
REACH candidates.
The basic dog factor immediately eliminates many properties from
consideration. Some properties are simply so poorly conceived, even
considerably reduced acquisition prices would not reduce debt service enough to
make them feasible. Second, MHFA's high underwriting standards dismisses
many properties for non-compliance, and discourages others from even
applying. As noted many times in this thesis, these properties were not built with
MHFA's goals in mind. Despite the Agency's willingness to negotiate some
contract points, such as security requirements, overall standards may still be too
high for these properties. Therefore, the Agency should consider where it is
willing to be more lenient without sacrificing feasibility. Broadway Tower also
illustrated this point with the much-disputed, privately-held units.
The third factor in limiting the pipeline concerns program and Agency
marketing. The lack of fanfare, and the abundance of requirements do not seem
to have enticed many developers. Though it is difficult to assess how many
people received the REACH brochure, a spot check of two well-respected
community development corporations as well as a development consultant
revealed that several project managers had never heard of the program. These
facts, plus developers' perceptions that MHFA comes into the financing picture
too late to influence proposals, discussed above, support the conclusion that the
program has not been effectively marketed.
Interviews with developers also indicate that the Agency itself has a
lingering reputation for being bureaucratic and "picky." This indicates that the
Agency might consider trying to change its image to one that is more open to less
conventional projects in order to enlarge the pipeline to all of its programs.
The final factor in determining the size of the REACH pipeline is
suggested by the Wholesale Phenomenon. As introduced in Chapter II, banks are
trying aggressive strategies of bulk sales and securitization to dispose of bulk
properties. The trade off, of course, is the higher price-less risk of individual
workouts versus the lower price-more risk of a bulk sale. As bulk sales become a
more accepted strategy, as numerous professionals and trade magazines have
indicated, developers, investors, and lenders will weigh the benefits offered by
each approach. In addition, bulk sales may have an effect on the accepted price
for other non-performing properties. A commitment to REO, therefore, should
consider the potential for MHFA to purchase a portfolio and pass substantial
savings on to developers.
This thesis has raised many issues that the implementation of a program
designed to finance non-performing assets must address. The next sections offer
some steps that MHFA can begin to take to synthesize these issues. I also offer
some less conventional suggestions to consider as REACH rethinks its own
direction and goals.
(3) OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The general consensus of the MHFA Development Department and this thesis is
that REACH has not done what it was designed to do: create affordable rental
housing opportunities and promote economic recovery. It is worth revisiting
these goals here to assess whether they were realistic. If MHFA decides to pursue
a commitment to converting REO properties to affordable housing, the
remainder of this section concentrates on three directions the Agency can pursue
to increase the REACH pipeline:
1. improving the program's marketing
2. restructuring the program's financing and underwriting, and
3. reconsidering the Agency's approach to REO
Goals
Though the REACH program was an expression of MHFA's willingness to
consider REO, it was not significant enough to signal to developers, or banks,
that there was a real commitment on the Agency's part. This indicates that the
Agency may not have had as deep an interest in converting REO properties to
affordable housing as was initially promoted. Nor was the Agency's interest
strong enough to commit adequate resources to create a real program. This is
evidenced by the extremely small number of projects in the REACH pipeline and
the failure to finance another deal since Broadway Tower.
REACH's secondary goal was to promote economic development. This
topic was not addressed in this thesis largely because REACH's role in economic
development has been neglible, based on the number of developments in the
pipeline.
Obviously, Revere's downtown benefitted from having an occupied
Broadway Tower versus an empty building. Empty buildings are often the sites
of illegal uses, eyesores, and a cause of decreased consumer confidence.
Broadway Tower may also have provided several temporary construction jobs.
But the REACH program's economic development goals addressed economic
recovery and the rehabilitation of banks-an extremely tall order. Therefore, this
thesis may be most useful if used as a catalyst for MHFA to reassess its
commitment to REO and its goals for the program.
Clearly defined goals with a smaller scope, such as a new subsidy or
alternative financing, might be the most logical step to take-after MHFA's initial
step of declaring interest-in the development of an REO strategy. Once MHFA
defines more attainable goals, and reassesses its commitment to REO, it can begin
to process the experiences learned from the initial REACH launch. The following
section looks at diverse strategies for increasing the pipeline, should the Agency
conclude that it is indeed committed to REO.
Marketing
One of the biggest obstacles between the REACH pipeline and developers
is the Agency itself. MHFA suffers from its own reputation as bureaucratic,
discriminating, and conservative. Although these are qualities that often describe
a prudent financial institution, MHFA must address the impact its image is
having in a difficult development period. An integrated, cost-effective strategy
for publicizing REACH and indicating the Agency's openness to new ideas
might include a series of developer workshops, press releases, more high-profile
partnerships with the State and the RTC on REACH, and more advertising. A
follow-up brochure or mailing to the REACH mailing list might also follow the
lead of more successful advertisers with punchier copy and fewer demands. It
might also signal the Agency's renewed commitment to REO.
REACH has also suffered from ineffective developer input. The ability to
respond to the voice of the customer is an advantage for any product. Tailoring
the program to address developer concerns, would also improve MHFA's image,
as well as improve the product. For example, once non-profit developers told the
RTC that the high loan-to-value ratio required for participation in their direct
sales program was a hardship, the RTC changed the requirement and
participation has increased. REACH's developer input originated mainly from
MHFA's Multifamily Advisory Committee, which was very sceptical of the
program. MHFA staff members will counter defensively that other developers
can always give their input to the Agency. A stronger message, however, would
be for the Agency to call a focus group of developers and appreciate the real
value of their insight. A focus group would have the added benefit of involving
MHFA in the REO thinking process much earlier.
Restructuring
A second direction for the Agency to pursue is the restructuring of the
program to make it more attractive to developers. In addition to incorporating
developer feedback, the Agency is in a good position to improve the program
with an additional subsidy. In the case of Broadway Tower, Winn suggested that
the MHFA provide the retracted RDAL subsidy with money that has been
refunded to the Agency from HUD due to the lowering of interest rates. The
inclusion of a subsidy is currently being proposed by the program's director.
The benefits of an additional subsidy would be to allow MHFA to
subscribe to more of its current underwriting standards. Some properties that
meet agency guidelines for affordable housing, but cannot support debt service,
would become feasible. Charles Gladstone suggests that
the structure for the REACH subsidy should take the form of subordinate
debt to be serviced if possible from available cash flow. Payment of
outstanding principal and any accrued interest would occur upon sale or
refinancing of the property which would not be permitted prior to 10
years from the initial draw down of the loan. This structure represents a
basic shift from the debt service reduction/operating subsidy popular in
the 1980s. The change in structure reflects the lack of interest income that
could be generated today by investing the subsidy fund in an annuity
used to leverage debt in the early years of the project life.2
Mr. Gladstone also believes the Agency could be working with other institutions,
such as the FDIC or Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities and
2Based on a conversation with Charles Gladstone, Development Officer and REACH program
director, MHFA. 11/5/1992
Development, to allocate a subsidy for REO properties. The second prong in
restructuring the program involves revising the Agency's underwriting
standards. Though it is beyond the scope of this thesis, and the experience of this
author, to recommend specific changes to underwriting, developers have
indicated several possibilities worth exploring. For example, decreasing
replacement reserve requirements, negotiating lower credit enhancement fees,
and decreasing Agency inspection and financing fees.
Reconsidering
The final direction the Agency could pursue would be to consider a
different approach to, or different role in, the REO market. Trade journals and
newspapers have recently reported the growing markets in bulk real estate sales
and asset securitization. Entering this market at the outset may provide a way for
MHFA to enter the marketing process earlier, provide more attractive acquisition
prices to developers, and facilitate the selection of properties available to
developers.
For example, the RTC and several private banks have begun selling
packages of non-performing mortgages and REO properties to institutional
investors at deeply discounted prices. Once the institutional investors purchase
the packages, they have three options available to them.
1. holding
2. flipping
3. securitizing
It is worth looking briefly at each of these strategies and how they could
comprise a more comprehensive strategy at MHFA. After an investor, such as GE
Capital Corporation or an investment bank, purchases a bulk sale, it can hold the
property until the real estate market improves and some of the excess property is
absorbed. Investment banks also try to improve the management of distressed
properties to facilitate their recovery. Flipping also takes advantage of the
discounts associated with very large packages. Large investors can then sell
smaller packages to other investors interested in adding to their own portfolios.
The securitization of these non-performing mortgages is largely
anticipated by investment banking houses, but the market is not completely
developed. In this option, an institutional investor purchases a bulk sale, and
then allocates the cash flows to different classes of investors based on their
appetite for risk. In this way, the securities attain a higher credit rating than the
underlying assets.
Though the bulk sales and securitization markets are definitely
developing, such an approach represents a radical departure from typical MHFA
financing. It is hard to deny, however, that as the Agency becomes more
experienced with non-traditional loans and its own non-performing asset
management, purchasing a bulk sale for future development could be a viable
and cost-effective strategy.
As a strategy now being considered by many banks, it might also be the
most competitive strategy for attracting developers. Purchasing a bulk sale,
rehabilitating it, and managing it back to health, and then marketing to
developers, could all be performed by Agency staff. It could be the ideal option
for the goal of converting REO to affordable housing. Before MHFA can consider
another strategy, however, again it is imperative to consider goals and where the
Agency stands on REO.
It is clear that MHFA has taken great strides in affordable housing
innovation. Also evident, though, is the magnitude of the REO and non-
performing asset problem, which seems to require a multi-faceted approach.
MHFA has been a strategy leader at the project level, but must continue to
improve on itself, and recognize new trends in the real estate market.
The First MHFA Proposal-from the Broadway Tower Official Action Status Application to MHFA, 3/12/91.
INCOME/YEAR
Rental Income
Less Vacancy
Annual Increase Income
Annual Increase Expenses
1 2
$937,536 $965,662
($46,877) ($48,283)
3.00%
3.00%
3
$994,632
($49,732)
$1,024,471 $1,055,205 $1,086,861 $1,119,467 $1,153,051 $1,187,643 $1,223,272
($51,224) ($52,760) ($54,343) ($55,973) ($57,653) ($59,382) ($61,164)
5.00%
Other Income:
Laundry $6,624
Owner's Subsidy $16,200
RDAL Subsidy $230,000
Total Income $1,143,483
OPERATING EXPENSES ($386,400)
Per Unit= ($4,200)
NET OPERATING INCOME $757,083
DEBT SERVICE $705,303
$6,600,876 Mortgage
10.09% Rate
30 Year Term
CASHFLOW $51,780
DEBT SERV. COVERAGE 1.07
PV of CF 20 years @ 12% $546,236
$6,823 $7,027
$0 $0
$249,624
$1,173,826
$233,838
$1,185,766
$7,238
$0
$217,578
$1,198,064
($397,992) ($409,932) ($422,230)
$775,834
$705,303
$775,834
$705,303
$70,531 $70,531
1.10 1.10
$7,455 $7,679 $7,909 $8,147
$0 $0 $0 $0
$200,830 $183,580 $165,813 $147,512
$1,210,730 $1,223,777 $1,237,216 $1,251,057
$8,391
$0
$128,662
$1,265,314
$8,643
$0
$109,247
$1,279,998
($434,897) ($447,944) ($461,382) ($475,223) ($489,480) ($504,164)
$775,834 $775,834
$705,303 $705,303
$70,531
1.10
$70,531
1.10
$775,834
$705,303
$775,834
$705,303
$775,834 $775,834 $775,834
$705,303 $705,303 $705,303
$70,531 $70,531 $70,531 $70,531 $70,531
1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
Exhibit 1I
The Concord Mortgage Company Proposal.
Annual Increase Income
Annual Increase Expenses
INCOME/YEAR
Rental Income
Less Vacancy
Other Income:
Laundry
Owner's Subsidy
RDAL Subsidy
Total Income
5.00%
OPERATING EX
NET OPERATIN
DEBT SERVICE
CASHFLOW
DEBT SERV. C
PV of CF 20 year
PENSES ($372,255)
Per Unit= ($4,046)
G INCOME $738,123
$715,510
$6,300,000 Mortgage
10.40% Rate
25 Year Term
$22,613
)VERAGE 1.03
s@ 12% $430,605
($383,423) ($394,925) ($406,773)
$772,991 $772,906
$715,510 $715,510
$57,481
1.08
$57,396
1.08
$772,818
$715,510
($418,976) ($431,546) ($444,492) ($457,827) ($471,561) ($485,708)
$772,727
$715,510
$772,634 $772,539
$715,510 $715,510
$57,308 $57,217 $57,124
1.08 1.08 1.08
$57,029
1.08
$772,439
$715,510
$772,337
$715,510
$56,930 $56,827
1.08 1.08
Notes: The Concord Mortgage Company estimated a debt service payment
of $707,063 for the same terms. Their PV of the cash flow plus the reversion
value totalled $8,073,899.
Source: Underwriting memorandum of the Concord Mortgage Company (reformatted). 1991.
3.00%
3.00%
1
$916,836
($45,842)
$9,384
$0
$230,000
$1,110,378
2
$944,341
($47,217)
$9,666
$0
$249,624
$1,156,414
3
$972,671
($48,634)
$9,955
$0
$233,838
$1,167,831
4
$1,001,851
($50,093)
$10,254
$0
$217,578
$1,179,591
5
$1,031,907
($51,595)
$10,562
$0
$200,830
$1,191,703
6
$1,062,864
($53,143)
$10,879
$0
$183,580
$1,204,180
7
$1,094,750
($54,738)
$11,205
$0
$165,813
$1,217,031
8
$1,127,593
($56,380)
$11,541
$0
$147,512
$1,230,266
9
$1,161,420
($58,071)
$11,887
$0
$128,662
$1,243,899
10
$1,196,263
($59,813)
$12,244
$0
$109,247
$1,257,941
$772,233
$715,510
$56,723
1.08
Exhibit 2
The Revised MHFA Proposal Under the REACH Program-from MHFA Project Commitment Proposal Form, March 9, 1992.
Annual Increase Income
Annual Increase Expenses
5.00%
INCOME/YEAR
Rental Income
Less Vacancy
Other Income:
Laundry
Owner's Subsidy
MHFA Subsidy
Total Income
OPERATING EXPENSES
Per Unit=
NET OPERATING INCOME
DEBT SERVICE
1
$937,536
($46,877)
$6,624
$39,999
$165,000 $1
$1,102,282 $1,
2
$965,662
($48,283)
3
$994,632
($49,732)
$6,823 $7,027
$0 $0
65,000 $165,000
)89,202 $1,116,928
($449,432) ($462,915)
($4,885)
$652,850 $626,287
$414,482 $414,482
$3,750,000 Mortgage
10.50% Rate
30 Year Tern
DEBT SERVICE MGLB $179,875
$2,500,000 Subordinat
CASHFLOW $58,493
DEBT SERV. COVERAGE 1.1
PV of CF 20 years @ 12% $873,083
$179,875
e Mortgage
$31,930
0 1.05
4
$1,024,471
($51,224)
$7,238
$0
$165,000
$1,145,486
5
$1,055,205
($52,760)
$7,455
$0
$165,000
$1,174,900
6
$1,086,861
($54,343)
$7,679
$0
$165,000
$1,205,197
7
$1,119,467
($55,973)
$7,909
$0
$165,000
$1,236,403
8
$1,153,051
($57,653)
$8,147
$0
$165,000
$1,268,545
9
$1,187,643
($59,382)
$8,391
$0
$165,000
$1,301,652
10
$1,223,272
($61,164)
$8,643
$0
$165,000
$1,335,751
($476,802) ($491,106) ($505,840) ($521,015) ($536,645) ($552,745) ($569,327) ($586,407)
$640,125
$414,482
$654,379
$414,482
$669,060
$414,482
$684,182 $699,758
$414,482 $414,482
$715,800
$414,482
$732,325
$414,482
$749,344
$414,482
$179,875 $179,875 $179,875 $179,875 $179,875 $179,875 $179,875 $179,875
$45,769
1.07
$60,022
1.10
$74,704 $89,825 $105,401 $121,444 $137,968 $154,987
1.12 1.15 1.18 1.20 1.23 1.26
3.00%
3.00%
Exhibit 3
Exhibit 4 BROADWAY TOWER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
As of March 1, 1992
SCHEDULE A
Name and Business Address
Capital
Contributions
Percentage of
Partnership Interests for Class
GENERAL PARTNER:
Broadway Holdings, Inc.
c/o Winn Development Company
Six Faneuil Hall Marketplace
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Arthur M. Winn
c/o Winn Development Company
Six Faneuil Hall Marketplace
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
ORIGINAL PARTNER:
Winn Broadway Tower Limited Partnershi
c/o Winn Development Company
Six Faneuil Hall Marketplace
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
SPECIAL LIMITED PARTNER:
SLP, Inc.
101 Arch Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
INVESTOR LIMITED PARTNER:
Boston Financial Tax Credit Fund Plus,
A Limited Partnership
101 Arch Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
$99.00
$1.00
$10.00
$10.00
$2,200,000.00*
* $1,000 has been paid in as of the date of the Investment Closing;
$2,199,000 is to be paid in pursuant to Section 5.1a, subject to adjustment
and conditions to payment as provided herein.
Source: MHFA Broadway Tower closing documents, 1992.
99.00%
1.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
Exhibit 5 PRELIMINARY FNMA PROJECT VALUE-DIRECT CAPITALIZATION
Project Name: Broadway Tower
Location: Revere
Developer: Broadway Tower L.P.
MHFA #: 91-003-R File Name: BT.FNMA
Date: 4/25/91 Revised
Appraiser: R. Quealy
Annual Project Income
Vacancy & Collection:
Market:
Subsidized/Low:
Market:
Subsidized:
Effective Gross Rental Income:
Other Income:
Laundry
Less Vacancy:
Parking:
Less Vacancy:
RDAL Loan: If
Total Other Income:
Effective Gross Total Income:
Annual Operating Expenses:
Net Project Income:
Capitalized Value: Market Rate
Maximum Mortgage: (90%)
$300,600
$553,512
$21,042
$16,605
$816,465
0.070
0.030
0.05
Funded (Yr. 1)
$6,624
$331
$0
$0
$230,000
$236,293
$1,052,757
$407,580
(4,430 p/u)
$645,177
$5,865,249
$5,278,725
0.110000
0.90
Requested Loan:
Less FNMA Fee @ 4.75%
Maximum Loan Less FNMA Fee
(6,286,500/5,865,249)
Rent Summary:
Market: Unit Type
1BR/1B
2BR/2B
Number S.F.
9 630sf
54 950sf
Low-Income: (Section 8/707 Certificates)
1BR/1B 5 630sf
(Maximum FMR of $672 is
2BR/2B 24 950sf
Total: 92
Source: MHFA Appraisal and
1991.
$650
above estimated Market)
$794
Marketing Department, Robert Quealy,
$6,600,000
$313,500
$6,286,500
107.18%
Rent
$650
$800
Exhibit 6 Mortgage Position
Exhibit 7 REACH Implications
$8m
$6.25m
$5m
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Original Mortgage
Inherent Subsidy received by
New Developer-i.e. reduced
acquisition
New Mortgage-REACH
Actual Mortgage (approx.)
that Broadway Tower could
support through income and
cash flow
Implications: 1. The reduced acquisition price is the real subsidy
2. REACH is still not enough to make REOs feasible
3. The deal would not have been feasible without the
RDAL operating subsidy to replace the debt service
required to receive the higher loan amount.
Exhibit 8
AFFORDABLE HOUSING DISPOSITION PROGRAM
MULTIFAMILY SALES PROGRAMS
AHD Properties Identified
Notice of Marketing period
(Public Agencies)
Agency Selects Property
Notice of Serious Interest
Agency Prepares Offer
Bona Fide Offer
Agency Does Due Diligence
RTC Underwrites Property
Executed Contract
Prepare for Closing
Closing
30 Days
Notice of Marketing
No Period (Nonprofits)
30 Days Organization
Selects Properties
Notice of Serious Interest
60 Days Organization Prepares
Offer
Bona Fide Offer
30 Days Organization Does
Due Diligence
RTC Underwrites Property
Executed Contract
Prepare for Closing
Closing
30 Days
No
30 Days
60 Days
30 Days
All Qualified Buyers
Clearinghouse
Notice of Serious Interest
Organization Prepares
Offer
Bona Fide Offer
Organization Does
Due Dilligence
Executed Contract
Prepare for Closing
Closing
Source: Resolution Trust Corporation, 1991.
45-90 Days
45 Days
60 Days
(if > $500K)
30 Days
Exhibit 9
SOURCES OF DEBT FINANCING AVAILABLE TO SMALL PROJECTS WITH 40 OR FEWER UNITS
A Comparison of Terms and Standards of Three Quasi-Public Agencies
MHFA Current Policy Massachusetts Land Bank Massachusetts Housing Partnership
Eligible Borrowers ltd. dividend, non-profit For profit, non-profit, public For profit, non-profit
Min. Loan Size none published none published $100,000
Max. Loan Size none $2 mil, or 50,000/afford. unit $2 million
Max. Loan to Value 90% 90% (80% on subordinates) 80% (exceptions to 85%)
Project Size none published Family: 20-50 units projects with 5-20 units
SROs: 8-30 units have been prioritized
Max. Loan Term/Amortization 30-35 years/30-35 years 15 years/30 years 20 years/30 years
Contruction Financing yes. no; breakeven occupancy no; breakeven occupancy
Debt Service Coverage minimum 110% minimum 110% minimum 110%(115% for < 20 units
Loan Security 6% Letter of Credit Operating reserve = 35% of 6% Letter of Credit
annual operating budget plus
3% of gross mo. Inc.
Subordinate Loans Limited to soft 2nds Provides LB amortizing 2nds; Allows soft 2nds
allows other soft 2nds
Replacement Reserves Min. $275/unit/year Case by case basis Mi. $275/unit/year($180/unit/year for SROs)
Rates (October 1992) 8.5% +.5% Taxable 7.0% Taxable 2.1% above Treasury yields
6.75% + .5 Tax Exempt (from General Ob. Bonds) (9.5%, on 10/21/92)
Fees 2.8, Constr. & perm. .5% plus actual LB expenses $250-500 applicatn (non-vs. for
1.15%, Perm. Only for public hearing, appraisal, profit)
arch. & Const. review, closing, plus .1% for amts over $500,000
1% loan origination fee
'2-4.75% Credit Enhancmt
Source: Report of the Small Projects Task Force, Nancy Andersen, MHFA, 1992.
Exhibit 10
REA C H
R E C O V E R Y THROUGH T H E A C QU IS IT I ON OF H O U S I N G
General Information
Program Objective
To create affordable rental housing opportiities and promote economic recovery by financing the
acquisitioin a nd rehabilitation of distressed, Iank-foreclosed and government-held properties.
Background
O ver the past two years, banks and federal banking
regulators have b come the holders of significant
amounts of foreclosed multifamily properties in
Massachusetts due to the softening of real estate
markets. Thtese developments include newly con-
structed projects which were never completed or fully
rented, as well as older properties with significant
deferred maintenance and /or capital replacement
needs. In either case, such properties are generally
characterized by high vacancy rates and financial
infeasibilitv.
In addition to providing an opportunity to increase
the supply of affordable rental housing, utilization
of these properties can aid in the recovery of the
Commonwealth's lending institutions, generate
employment opportunities, and enhance neighbor-
hood revitalization efforts. Taking maximum
advantage of these properties is, in fact, identified
in the Commonwealth's Comprehensive Housing
Affordability Strategy (CHAS) as a top priority
for the 1990's.
Program Concept
VIFA's ability to provide acquisition, rehabilita-
tion and long-term debt financing in a single under-
writing provides a unique opportunity to utilize bank-
and- government-held housing resources. For
qualified projects and borrowers, below-market tax-
exempt financing used in conjunction with low-
income housing tax credits and discounted acquisition
costs can provide a cost-effective financing package
with little or no state or local subsidies. Rehabilitation
expenditures for such projects must equal or exceed
15% of the cost of acquiring the buildings, and owners
must reserve at least 20% of the development's units
for low-income households for at least 30 years. For
other projects, taxable bond financing may be com-
bined with below-market acquisition costs and outside
subsidy resources to produce economically viable
developments.
Developers of properties under the REACH pro-
gram must demonstrate awareness of the needs
of existing residents, particularly in terms of avoid-
ing relocation and involuntary displacement. To
reduce the need for off-site relocation, an eligible
development should have sufficient vacancies to
accommodate existing residents during the renova-
tion process. In addition, an analysis of existing
rents and incomes should be performed so that a
rent phasing plan can be developed which enables
current residents to continue their tenancies.
REACH is.a crvic i fthc Exccurivc Oftiec of Communitics and
Decelopmnti .nJ thc Mhia:huctts Housinc Financc Aacncy
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PERMANENT FINANCING BELOW 8%!
If you'r waiting for rates to bottom out, we believe it's time to get off the fence!!!
Rates are currently at their lowest point in over two decades. We currently
have a limited supply or immediate and forward funding loans for apartment,
retail, owner-occupied or builts-to-suit properties. Do not delay in calling us
for a quote. The backlog of loan proposals is building quickly and the
consensus is that rates will rise later this year as the economy begins to
rebound. Many of your existing lenders are eager to reduce their exposure to
real estate. They may be willing to discuss negotiating prepayment premiums
you might be subject to.
Remember, in today's more complex financing market it takes at least 90 days
to take a loan proposal through committee and to closing. So, lock into these
favorable rates now!
Rates are as low as:
3 years -7%
5 years - 7-1/4%
7 years - 7-3/8%
10 years - 8-1/2%
The Boston Financial Mortgage Finance Group, representing Lincoln
National Life Insurance Company as mortgage loan correspondent, is pleased
to announce some enhancements to Lincoln's programs:
V Lincoln has reduced their fees from 1/4-1/2% of the loan amount to a flat
$2,500.
V Lincoln has eliminated full board review for loans below $7,000,000.
V They have initiated a more simplified application and closing process.
If you would like to lock into these lower rates or find out more
about Lincoln's program, please contact us. 0h
Wayne Clough or John Gorga
The Boston Financial Group
101 Arch Street
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 439-3911 (Telephone)
(617) 439-9979 (Fax)
:*: :
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Interview List
Shirley Abrams, Development Officer, MHFA
Nancy Andersen, Development Officer, MHFA
Lawrence Bacow, Professor of Urban Studies, MIT
Robert Baker, Director of Development, Land Bank
Timothy Bassett, Executive Director, Land Bank
Barbara Bryan, National Association of Homebuilders
Frank Creedon, Operation Officer, MHFA
Charles Gladstone, Development Officer, MHFA
Michael Jacobs, Senior Development Officer, MHFA
Donna Jervey, Investor Services, RTC
Langley Keyes, Professor of Urban Studies, MIT
Cynthia La Casse, Development Officer, MHFA
Jean McCarthy, Appraisal and Marketing Officer, MHFA
Jan Nicholson, Vice President, Real Estate Group, Citicorp
Bernard O'Shaugnessy, Attorney, MHFA
Lawrence Packenham, Shawmut Bank
Rufus Philips, Senior Public Information Officer, MHFA
Robert Quealy, Appraisal and Marketing Officer, MHFA
Cynthia Reed-Workman, Attorney, MHFA
Jim Roth, Securities Division, RTC
Christopher Seyfarth, Vice President, Kenneth Leventhal, Inc.
Sue Valenti, Associate, Mortgage Department, First Boston Corporation
Eleanor White, Deputy Director, MHFA
Four developers were also interviewed, but they prefer to remain anonymous
due to the nature of their relationship with the Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency.
